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Abstract 
While a globally energizing influence of motivation has long been appreciated in 
psychological research, a series of more recent studies has described motivational 
influences on specific cognitive operations ranging from visual attention, to cognitive control, 
to memory formation. In the majority of these studies, a cue predicts the potential to win 
money in a subsequent task, thus allowing for modulations of proactive task preparation. 
Here we describe some recent studies using tasks that communicate reward availability 
without such cues by directly associating specific task features with reward. Despite 
abolishing the cue-based preparation phase, these studies show similar performance 
benefits. Given the clear difference in temporal structure, a central question is how these 
behavioral effects are brought about, and in particular whether control processes can rapidly 
be enhanced reactively. We present some evidence in favor of this notion. Although 
additional influences, for example sensory prioritization of reward-related features, could 
contribute to the reward-related performance benefits, those benefits seem to strongly rely 
on enhancements of control processes during task execution. Still, for a better mechanistic 
understanding of reward benefits in these two principal paradigms (cues vs. no cues), more 
work is needed that directly compares the underlying processes. We anticipate that reward 
benefits can be brought about in a very flexible fashion depending on the exact nature of the 
reward manipulation and task, and that a better understanding of these processes will not 
only be relevant for basic motivation research, but that it can also be valuable for educational 
and psychopathological contexts. 
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Introduction 
While a globally energizing influence of (typically reward-induced) motivation on human 
cognitive and motor functions has long been recognized in psychological research, a series 
of recent studies has described motivational influences on more specific cognitive 
operations. Beyond increasing the frequency of a specific action in accordance with the 
principles of reinforcement learning, the prospect of reward has been shown to improve 
performance in different domains ranging from visual attention, to cognitive control, to 
memory formation (e.g., Adcock et al., 2006; Locke and Braver, 2008; Engelmann et al., 
2009; Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010; Krebs et al., 2011; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011; Krebs 
et al., 2012; Schmidt et al., 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Braver et al., 2014). To date, most 
(but not all) of these studies identified reward effects by using block designs or variants of the 
monetary-incentive delay (MID) task, in which a cue indicates the prospect of reward for an 
upcoming task. In this chapter, we will start with a general description of such paradigms for 
context, but then mostly focus on a more recent line of studies that manipulate reward 
prospect in a trial-by-trial fashion in the absence of pre-target cues by linking reward 
prospect directly to features of the target stimuli.  
The classic paradigm to study the neural underpinnings of reward effects in humans, 
the MID task (Knutson et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001), has been inspired by research in 
non-human primates (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2001). In numerous studies in macaques, 
these researchers observed increased phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons located in the 
midbrain when the animals received a primary reward. Critically, after a learning phase, a 
similar neural response can also be observed for conditioned stimuli that reliably predict such 
rewards (cues), thus “replacing” the response to the actual reward. This reward-anticipation 
response is thought to not only reflect reward value, but to simultaneously represent an 
activating signal that energizes behavioral and mental processes required to obtain the 
predicted reward (Berridge, 2007; Robbins and Everitt, 2007; Salamone, 2009). In the MID 
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task, human participants are typically explicitly informed about the reward contingencies of 
specific visual cues in advance (mostly bonus money), thereby usually, but not always, 
omitting the conditioning phase that is typical for animal studies. Analogous to the animal 
work, it is assumed that reward-predictive cues as well as unexpected rewarding outcomes 
will trigger activity in the dopaminergic system, while outcomes that are reliably predicted by 
a cue will not or no longer elicit such responses (Pagnoni et al., 2002; Knutson and Cooper, 
2005).  
Importantly, dopaminergic responses seem to be capable of altering subsequent neural 
processing in a number of ways, ranging from a global broadcast signal projected to a 
widespread set of cortical and subcortical areas, to more local influences on specific neural 
computations (Braver et al., 2014). As alluded to above, the MID task, that originally involved 
a simple target-detection task (e.g., Knutson et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001), has recently 
been extended to other research domains, ranging from visual attention (e.g., Engelmann 
and Pessoa, 2007; Krebs et al., 2012), to various cognitive-control functions (e.g., Padmala 
and Pessoa, 2011; Schmidt et al., 2012), to memory encoding (e.g., Wittmann et al., 2005; 
Adcock et al., 2006). Despite substantial differences between these cognitive domains and 
tasks, the general facilitative effect of reward cues on human performance has proven to be 
remarkably consistent. This notion has been nicely captured in a recent preview article that 
titled “Anything you can do, you can do better: neural substrates of incentive-based 
performance enhancement” (Liljeholm and O'Doherty, 2012). The results of various 
functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that employed such cuing paradigms 
suggest that the beneficial effects of reward seem to rely on modulations of proactive control 
processes that facilitate the processing of the upcoming target. Hence, it has been proposed 
that reward acts as a mediator on the respective cognitive functions in a top-down 
preparatory fashion (Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010; Chelazzi et al., 2013). In other words, 
the reward information carried by the cue seems to be used in order to prepare an optimal 
state for successful task performance, which will enable improved target-detection sensitivity 
(Engelmann and Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et al., 2009), enhanced suppression of task-
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irrelevant interfering information (Padmala and Pessoa, 2011), or facilitate stimulus encoding 
into long-term memory (Adcock et al., 2006) – just to name a few processes that seem to be 
amenable to such reward influences.  
The above observations suggest that reward cues largely exert their influence on 
different cognitive systems in a preparatory manner – before the respective task is actually 
executed, with actual task execution being superior as a consequence of this reward-
triggered preparation (see also Manelis and Reder, 2013). In addition to fMRI evidence, with 
its limitation in temporal resolution, there is also evidence from electroencephalography 
(EEG) studies suggesting that indices of preparatory attention, specifically the contingent 
negative variation (CNV) and changes in alpha power, are amplified during the cue-target 
interval of reward compared to no-reward trials, and that the level of preparation indeed 
relates to subsequent task performance (Schevernels et al., 2014; van den Berg et al., 
2014). Moreover, the results of a recent study, in which fMRI and EEG data were acquired 
simultaneously while participants performed an MID task, suggest that the CNV modulation 
during reward anticipation is brought about by a combination of subcortical reward-
anticipation activity and a top-down regulation of it (Plichta et al., 2013).  
While not in the focus of the current chapter, we note that similar beneficial effects 
have been observed using blocked reward manipulations that likely induce changes in 
sustained rather than transient preparation, or a combination thereof (e.g., Locke and Braver, 
2008; Kouneiher et al., 2009; Jimura et al., 2010; Padmala and Pessoa, 2010; Soutschek et 
al., 2014). Ignoring differences in experimental design, the results from both reward cuing 
and blocked reward studies seem to indicate that the beneficial effects of reward prospect on 
task performance largely arise from proactive top-down control mechanisms that modulate 
the processing of the succeeding target stimuli. In what follows we will discuss a set of 
experiments where such proactive control effects are unlikely to impart a differential effect for 
reward-related trials because it is impossible to predict their occurrence, and hence to 
prepare for them in a trial-by-trial fashion. 
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Within-trial reward manipulations without cues 
Considering the before-mentioned studies, one might come to the conclusion that 
preparatory proactive control processes are a necessity for the behavioral benefits of reward 
to occur, especially in tasks that are performed rapidly, which would leave little time to bring 
about reward-related processing enhancements during task execution. The question of 
whether reward effects can occur in the absence of such temporally-separated preparation 
processes may furthermore be ecologically relevant in that real life might not always provide 
a temporal separation between a moment when reward availability is signaled/registered and 
when one needs to act on this information. To explore this topic, a recent series of studies 
has taken a different approach, which excludes a differential influence of global proactive 
control processes by design. Specifically, information about the availability of reward is linked 
to features of the target stimulus itself, for example the color, in the absence of a cue that 
would precede the target in the MID task. Given that such stimulus-reward association (SRA) 
paradigms don’t follow the traditional MID structure (cue-target-feedback), reward benefits in 
such tasks would likely have to rely on more reactive or even automatic processes compared 
to MID tasks. Such a distinction could fit well onto a prominent model of cognitive control, the 
dual mechanisms of control (DMC) framework by Braver and colleagues (Braver et al., 2007; 
Braver, 2012), which posits that control can flexibly be implemented either proactively or 
reactively. Although this model usually assumes that reward motivation generally leads to 
enhanced proactive control (e.g., Jimura et al., 2010), one of the key points of the model is 
the flexibility with which control can be adapted to different situations. Given this notion, it 
seems possible that reactive control might also profit from such motivation, in particular in 
situations in which proactive control cannot easily be used to enhance performance. In the 
following, we will first introduce two SRA paradigms in some detail, one probing conflict 
resolution (Krebs et al., 2010) and one probing response inhibition (Boehler et al., 2012). In 
both paradigms, reward prospect is indicated by the color of the task-relevant stimuli, 
randomly varied from trial to trial. Afterwards, we will discuss the potential neural 
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mechanisms underlying the observed behavioral effects, also with reference to the more 
common MID manipulations.    
Rewarded Stroop task. The first SRA paradigm we will discuss (Krebs et al., 2010) is in 
essence a regular color-naming Stroop task with manual responses (MacLeod, 1991). In 
each trial, a word stimulus is presented on the screen in one of four font colors (red, green, 
blue, yellow) and participants are required to press one out of four buttons to indicate the 
current font color. Additionally, participants are informed before the experiment that fast and 
correct responses to two specific font colors (e.g., red and green) can lead to a monetary 
bonus. As in the regular color-naming Stroop task, the meaning of the word stimulus can be 
congruent (e.g., the word RED written in red ink), incongruent (e.g., the word GREEN written 
in red ink) or “neutral” with respect to the font color (e.g., the word BROWN written in red 
ink), which can be used as a baseline condition. We note that by associating the task-
relevant dimension of the word stimulus (i.e., font color) with reward or no-reward, we 
created two different types of incongruent word meanings – those that are related to reward 
and those that are not (e.g., RED vs. BLUE if red is a rewarded font color but blue is not). 
These incongruent reward-related and reward-unrelated word meanings could occur in both 
reward and no-reward trials, as could congruent and neutral word meanings. Importantly, 
word meanings were always irrelevant to the task and never predictive of reward. All trial 
types were randomly intermixed and occurred with the same probability, which means that 
participants had no way of knowing whether an upcoming trial would entail the chance for 
winning a reward or not and thus could not specifically prepare for reward and no-reward 
trials. Despite this, the behavioral results not only showed facilitation and interference effects 
commonly observed in the Stroop task, but also a large beneficial effect of reward prospect 
in the task-relevant dimension (about 100 ms on average). Interestingly, beyond this 
facilitative effect of reward in the relevant dimension (font color), interference effects were 
aggravated if the task-irrelevant dimension of an incongruent trial was related to reward (in 
the sense that the word referred to a reward color). However, task-relevant reward 
information seemed to prevent this additional interference. In essence, these results 
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demonstrate that within-trial reward information can change the way target stimuli are 
processed, despite the absence of pre-target cues and the preparatory mechanisms that 
may be triggered by such cues.  
Rewarded Stop-signal task. Inspired by the above findings, we applied the SRA logic to 
another cognitive-control function, namely response inhibition, i.e., withholding an already 
initiated response (Boehler et al., 2012). This function is especially interesting in the context 
of extrinsic motivation as it has been argued that response inhibition is a rather stable feature 
within individuals (Cohen and Poldrack, 2008), which is derailed in a number of prominent 
neurological and psychiatric disorders like attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and 
substance abuse (Barkley, 1997; Chambers et al., 2009; Ersche et al., 2012). Moreover, 
response inhibition has to be implemented relatively fast (typically within 250 ms; see below). 
Response inhibition is often studied using the Stop-signal task (e.g., Verbruggen and Logan, 
2008b), in which participants are asked to respond to a target in the majority of trials (e.g., 
80% Go trials), but to withhold their response whenever the target is rapidly followed by a 
Stop signal (e.g., 20% Stop trials). This task allows an estimation of how rapidly the initiated 
“Go-response” can be cancelled by computing the so-called Stop-signal response time 
(SSRT), which is derived from the stopping success rate in relationship to how fast a given 
participant is responding in Go trials and the stimulus-onset asynchrony between the Go 
signal and the Stop signal and usually yields values of around 200 ms (Verbruggen et al., 
2013).  
In order to investigate whether reward can modulate the ability to inhibit an already 
initiated response in the absence of any global preparatory control processes, our study 
provided reward information by the color of the Stop signal in the current paradigm, i.e., only 
after the Go-response was already triggered (Boehler et al., 2012). In addition to Go trials, 
the design thus included reward and no-reward Stop trials, which could further be divided in 
successful and unsuccessful Stop trials based on performance. The crucial questions were 
whether reward can a) affect response inhibition at all, in particular on such a fast timescale 
and if so, b) whether stopping would benefit or suffer from these within-trial reward 
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associations. The latter outcome would speak for a hard-wired natural mapping between 
reward and response execution that cannot be easily overruled (e.g., Guitart-Masip et al., 
2011; see also Chiu et al., 2014). Despite these alternatives, the results indicate that 
response inhibition can in fact profit from reward associations, both in terms of a faster SSRT 
when stopping success was paradigmatically equated across conditions, as well as in terms 
of stopping success when this was not the case. Both results indicate from different angles 
that reward information can indeed facilitate the implementation of response inhibition even 
in the absence of classic preparatory or strategic influences, which have also been generally 
documented to benefit response inhibition (e.g., Chikazoe et al., 2009). Intriguingly, these 
effects need to be implemented extremely rapidly (average SSRT around 200 ms) and seem 
to indicate that natural mappings between reward and response execution are either not 
relevant here, or are somehow overruled. 
 
Possible contributions of reactive control and bottom-up processes  
We conclude from the behavioral results above that the direct association between stimulus 
features and reward can facilitate performance in the Stroop as well as in the Stop-signal 
task in the absence of classic global proactive control processes. As a consequence, the 
question is: how are these within-trial effects are brought about, and how fast can they 
happen? Given the above documented speed, a key question is whether top-down control 
mechanisms play a role in bringing about the reward-related benefits, or whether such 
processes are somehow circumvented.  
Before discussing possible contributions of reactive control it is important to clarify what we 
mean by it. Specifically, we consider processes to reflect enhanced reactive control if they 
reflect enhancements of operations that take place in the respective tasks, which themselves 
are usually assumed to reflect reactive control (e.g., Aron, 2011; see also Ridderinkhof et al., 
2010; Scherbaum et al., 2011; Braver, 2012). Hence, one could rephrase the question as 
probing whether reward can rapidly enhance the control functions that are assumed to be 
involved in the respective cognitive-control function or whether the behavioral benefits are 
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brought about in a fashion that does not modulate or even preempt these processes. As 
such it is referring to active enhancements of the control processes that seem to generally 
implement the respective tasks (e.g., conflict resolution or response inhibition) rather than for 
example processes related to a rehashing of the task rules (e.g., Braver et al., 2007). We 
consider these processes to be enhanced reactively in SRA tasks if they display enhanced 
activity in reward compared to no-reward trials during task execution. This notion relates to 
observations that enhanced proactive control usually goes along with diminished activity in 
cognitive-control areas during task execution, and hence less reactive control (e.g., Paxton et 
al. 2008; Jimura et al., 2010, Chikazoe et al., 2009, Fan et al., 2007; Luks et al., 2007). This 
seems to indicate that if reward effects in SRA tasks would largely be driven by some form of 
proactive control, activity in control areas during task execution should be lower. Yet, one 
should note that a possible interplay between proactive and reactive processes cannot fully 
be excluded, as well as possibly independent contributions.  
Reactive control within-trials. Based on the above definition, there are indications in 
support of enhanced within-trial reactive control in the two SRA paradigms presented above. 
In fMRI versions of both the rewarded Stroop (Krebs et al., 2011) and the rewarded Stop-
signal paradigm (Boehler et al., 2014), we observed increased neural activity in the 
respective task-related cortical networks in reward compared to no-reward trials. Specifically, 
reward-related Stroop stimuli were associated with enhanced activity in dorsolateral 
prefrontal and inferior parietal regions, which are commonly implicated in cognitive-control 
tasks, including conflict processing (Banich et al., 2000; MacDonald et al., 2000; Botvinick et 
al., 2001; Nee et al., 2007). We performed an analogous analysis for the Stop-signal task. 
This analysis was further extended by using a conjunction analysis (corresponding to a 
logical “and”) to identify reward modulations that occurred not only in successful (and hence 
eventually rewarded) Stop trials, but also in unsuccessful (and hence ultimately unrewarded) 
Stop trials. This approach excludes reward modulations reflecting the subsequent positive 
evaluation of successful task performance, and should rather target processes that are 
triggered before the behavioral output. Despite this requirement for modulations to also be 
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present in unsuccessful trials, the comparison of reward and no-reward Stop trials revealed a 
network that included central regions of the inhibition-related network (for reviews see 
Chambers et al., 2009; Swick et al., 2011), namely a cluster comprising right anterior insula / 
inferior frontal gyrus as well as a cluster in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex / pre-
supplementary motor area. This enhanced involvement of critical task-related control areas 
in both the rewarded Stroop and Stop-signal tasks suggests that reward trials indeed entail 
enhanced reactive control (see also O'Connor et al., 2014).  
Turning back to the relationship between proactive preparation and task execution it is 
interesting to compare our fMRI Stroop study described above (Krebs et al., 2011) to a 
similar Stroop study using an MID-like set-up (Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). Specifically, 
Padmala and Pessoa (2011) employed a picture-word interference task in which a pre-target 
cue predicted the reward prospect of performance on the upcoming target display (task-
relevant pictures overlaid with task-irrelevant word labels). The behavioral effects of reward 
were very similar to the ones observed in our rewarded Stroop task, in that the influence of 
interfering words was reduced in cued reward trials. Moreover, the authors found a joint 
activation of reward-processing regions and a network of frontal, parietal, and occipital 
regions implicated in attentional control in response to the cue, which was highly consistent 
with our fMRI results in the rewarded Stroop task during task execution (Krebs et al., 2011). 
In the MID context of the Padmala and Pessoa study (2011), this activity pattern is 
interpreted as proactive control in preparation for the upcoming target in the form of selective 
attentional filtering of task-irrelevant information. Importantly, this enhanced proactive control 
went along with attenuated conflict-related activity during actual task execution, hence 
indeed suggesting that reward-related preparatory processes can alleviate the need for such 
processes during task execution. This contrasts with another recent study employed an MID 
version of the Stop-signal task to investigate proactive influences on response inhibition in 
the context of reward (Rosell-Negre et al., 2014). Here, the prospect of reward benefited Go-
trial performance, but also Stop-trial performance in that the SSRT was shorter after reward 
cues (note that reward cues only indicated that the next trial could yield a reward without 
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limiting this possibility to either Go trials or Stop trials) – the latter is analogous to the results 
of our rewarded Stop-signal paradigm (Boehler et al., 2012). In contrast to the Stroop task by 
Padmala and Pessoa (2011) discussed above, the study of Rosell-Negre and colleagues 
(2014) reported enhanced neural activity during response inhibition after reward cues in a 
network of prefrontal and parietal areas implicated in response inhibition, which resembles 
the findings of our rewarded Stop-signal task (Boehler et al., 2014). Of note, the neural 
responses during the cue phase were not explicitly analyzed in the study by Rosell-Negre 
and colleagues (2014).  
This general overlap of neural reward-related effects between MID and SRA studies 
raises a number of intriguing questions related to the relationship between reward-induced 
modulations in response to the cue and during actual task execution. In this context, the two 
aforementioned studies (Padmala & Pessoa 2011 vs. Rosell-Negre et al. 2014) seem to be 
somewhat at odds with each other, in the sense that proactive control seems to attenuate the 
need for control during task performance in the Stroop study (Padmala & Pessoa 2011), but 
not in the Stop-signal study (Rosell-Negre et al. 2014). This might relate to the fact that in the 
conflict task, participants can achieve better performance by enhancing their attentional 
focus on the task-relevant stimulus dimension, regardless of whether the upcoming task 
entails a conflict or not. Such focusing is not easily possible in the aforementioned version of 
the Stop-signal task, because the two potential tasks (stopping and going) would require 
different preparatory mechanisms, but the cue does not provide any information about the 
upcoming trial type. Along these lines, it is important to note that activity in areas related to 
response inhibition can indeed be diminished when participants could proactively prepare to 
inhibit (Chikazoe et al., 2009). Given that, it is also possible, albeit quite speculative, that 
reward benefits in a Stop-signal task in which both going and stopping are possibly rewarded 
are brought about in a fashion that is in fact mostly reactive, even if the general set-up is an 
MID task.  
Relationship to training effects. An important concept to consider is whether the general 
activity enhancement of task-related networks in reward trials reflects a basic training effect 
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that is further enhanced for reward trials. Specifically, one could argue that, although 
randomly intermixed, reward trials benefit more from practice in terms of a steeper learning 
curve. Yet, the data does not seem to support this notion. First and foremost, there is no 
indication for a differential effect of practice in reward trials in the behavioral data. We 
explicitly tested this in the fMRI Stop-signal paradigm by comparing the reward-related 
facilitation of SSRT between the first and second half of the experiment (Boehler et al., 
2014). While SSRTs were generally shorter in the second half due to practice, this effect was 
not enhanced for reward trials. We have analyzed the behavioral data of the fMRI Stroop 
paradigm in the same fashion (Krebs et al., 2011), and found an overall RT facilitation in the 
second compared to the first half of the experiment (p<.01), but no interaction with the 
facilitative effect of reward (interaction p>.5; unpublished data).  
Although a more fine-grained analysis might be necessary to clearly answer this 
question, the neural data also seem to speak against a differential practice effect. It has been 
shown that task-related networks display decreased activity with increased practice in 
cognitive tasks, including the Stroop task (e.g., Beauchamp et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2013). 
Enhanced practice effects in reward trials should therefore be reflected in decreased task-
related activity on average compared to no-reward trials. Similarly, a recent EEG study 
indicates that training in the Stop-signal task also results in a reduced engagement of the 
cortical (top-down) response-inhibition network (Manuel et al., 2013), which is the opposite of 
what we observed for the comparison of reward and no-reward Stop trials. Furthermore, 
when looking at response-inhibition tasks beyond the standard Stop-signal task, it has been 
shown that such tasks can (under specific circumstances) lead to the development of an 
automatic mapping between stimuli and response inhibition (e.g., Verbruggen and Logan, 
2008a). This effect, in turn, has been suggested to rely on an alternative route involving 
parietal areas that circumvents the frontal areas usually involved in response inhibition 
(Manuel et al., 2010; but see also Lenartowicz et al., 2011; Spierer et al., 2013); again, an 
effect that our data did not show an indication for as contributing to the reward-related 
enhancement of response inhibition. Together, it seems that differential practice effects in 
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reward versus no-reward trials were not responsible in bringing about the behavioral benefits 
in our SRA tasks. In both cases, the task-related networks are significantly more active 
during reward compared to no-reward trials, which seems to indicate an enhanced reactive 
engagement of the regions that are implicated in the task at hand. 
Bottom-up facilitation. That said, there is also evidence for some level of bottom-up 
prioritization in SRA paradigms, which we will detail in the following section. First, the 
rewarded Stroop EEG experiment discussed above did also reveal reward-related 
modulations that preceded the ERP components associated with conflict processing (Krebs 
et al., 2013). Specifically, we found that reward information was already registered as early 
as 200 ms after target onset, reflected in frontal and occipital ERP modulations. These 
effects are comparable with modulations in response to stimuli that have been associated 
with a positive outcome (Schacht et al., 2012), as well as to salient emotional stimuli of both 
negative and positive valence (e.g., Herbert et al., 2006; Stolarova et al., 2006; Kanske, 
2012). Moreover, in the visual-search domain, reward prospect has been found to modulate 
occipital ERP components related to the attentional orienting toward target singletons in a 
similar time range (Kiss et al., 2009). Together, it seems likely that the early ERP effects 
observed in the rewarded Stroop task index some sort of bottom-up prioritization of a salient 
reward-related feature, which could improve behavioral performance in a fashion that may 
not directly depend on reactive control processes. In addition, it is possible that such 
prioritization is not (exclusively) reflecting a bottom-up process but could also relate to 
proactive top-down processes that monitor more strongly for reward-related features in a 
strategic fashion (see also next section). Whatever the nature of such influences, however, it 
is important to note that in the SRA designs described above, such a possible sensory 
prioritization does not seem to alleviate the need for (likely reactive) control processes, in 
that reward trials still displayed more control-related activity. Yet, it is quite possible that the 
respective processes interact, such that e.g. an enhanced sensory response could facilitate 
control processes.Second, we have additional indications for some degree of automaticity 
with which reward information is processed and affects behavior. One behavioral observation 
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supporting this notion is the detrimental effect of task-irrelevant reward information carried by 
incongruent words in the rewarded Stroop task (Krebs et al., 2010). The most likely 
explanation for this is that reward-associated colors capture attention (or get prioritized in 
another fashion), regardless of whether they occur in the task-relevant or task-irrelevant 
target feature, due to some degree of acquired saliency. If the salient (reward-related) 
feature is in line with the task goal, and thus with the required behavioral response, this 
capture leads to response facilitation, while it will disrupt performance if it is incompatible with 
the task goal (incongruent word meaning). One can moreover approach the question of 
automaticity by removing reward contingencies from a previously rewarded task, thereby 
also removing any reward-trial-specific voluntary top-down engagement. We did this in the 
case of the rewarded Stroop task by adding an extra run with the explicit instruction that no 
reward is at stake anymore. Despite this instruction, participants were still significantly faster 
in trials with former reward colors, again speaking in favor of some (residual) enhanced low-
level saliency/prioritization. We applied a similar logic to the rewarded Stop-signal task and 
added an extra run in which participants were required to perform a speeded discrimination 
response to Go stimuli of different colors, including those that were previously used to 
indicate reward and no-reward Stop trials (Boehler et al., 2012). Like in the extra run of the 
Stroop task, there was nothing to win in this part of the experiment, which was made explicit 
to the participants, as well as the fact that there would be no Stop trials. Nevertheless, the 
results indicate that Go-trial responses were slower for trials that used former reward-related 
Stop colors compared to former reward-unrelated Stop colors. This suggests that some 
association between the reward feature and inhibition has been acquired in the main task, 
which lingers even if the task instructions and the task context (going instead of stopping) 
change. However, it should be noted that this effect was very small, and that we failed to 
replicate it (Boehler et al., 2014). 
Evidence for the notion that reward can increase sensory saliency comes for a large 
part from yet another reward regime, namely the biasing of visual attention after reward 
feedback (Della Libera and Chelazzi, 2006; Hickey et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011; Yantis 
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et al., 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Chelazzi et al., 2014). The crucial difference to the SRA 
paradigms presented above is that reward signals modulate attentional selection in an 
incidental, bottom-up fashion. Specifically, reward is signaled after task execution and is not 
predictive of reward in the next trial, which excludes the contribution of any proactive and 
reactive control mechanisms (but see Kristjansson et al., 2010). Nevertheless, these 
incidental reward signals induce substantial attentional biases, such as performance benefits 
or costs depending on whether the previous and the current target stimulus share a feature 
or not. Similar bottom-up effects have also been observed in the conflict-control domain (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2009; Braem et al., 2012). These studies report a modulation of the 
behavioral-adaptation effect that is typically observed after incongruent compared to 
congruent trials by incidental reward feedback. Taken together, it is not possible to exclude 
contributions of changes in sensory saliency to what we consider enhanced reactive control, 
but if so, this seems to enhance reactive control rather than circumventing it.  
Possible additional proactive effects. We have argued above that the results of the SRA 
tasks do not reflect the action of global proactive preparatory control as would be typical for 
MID-like tasks. However, this is not to say that any proactive influences are fully excluded, 
which theoretically could come in the form of specific preparation for a subset of 
stimuli/features in an SRA task, or global preparation. Concerning specific preparation, we 
cannot fully exclude that preparatory effects contribute to our reactive control enhancements, 
e.g., akin to a prepared reflex that specifies ahead of a trial a rule like “if X happens, do Y” 
(Verbruggen et al., in press), or top-down attentional biasing for the reward-related stimulus 
features, which both could be selectively applied to reward-related features. Again, however, 
if either mechanism would be implemented during the described SRA tasks they do not seem 
to  diminish the necessity for cognitive control during task execution in that activity in control-
related areas was enhanced rather than reduced in reward trials.   
 Concerning global preparation, the experiments we have detailed were designed to 
equate global proactive control levels by making the stimulus sequences unpredictable. Yet, 
this does not mean that there may not be an additional sustained (proactive) effect brought 
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about by the general reward context, which would become visible if one would compare task 
performance of no-reward trials that are presented in the context of reward trials with trials 
from a control block that exclusively features no-reward trials. Along such lines, a study on 
the influence of motivation on working memory has found that when (reward-sensitive) 
participants switch to a proactive control mode, it will be in fact the intermixed non-reward 
trials that profit most (Jimura et al., 2010). This latter study used a mixed event-related / 
block design, which is a very elegant approach for determining global pro-active context 
effects on no-reward trials. Finally, there are indications that the general context of reward 
can modulate more incidental aftereffects of behavioral performance - sometimes even to the 
disadvantage of non-reward trials. In brief, typical performance signatures of a) conflict 
adaptation (Braem et al., 2012) and b) action-effect binding (Muhle-Karbe and Krebs, 2012) 
were abolished in no-reward trials when they were intermixed with reward trials. This context 
effect might arise from a sustained strategic re-distribution of cognitive resources. 
The role of dopamine. Although neither fMRI nor EEG data directly reflect neurotransmitter 
dynamics, we would like to focus on the putative role of dopamine in SRA paradigms, in 
particular because the SRA task structure leaves substantially less time for any 
neuromodulatory process to unfold compared to the MID task, in which dopamine is 
assumed to play a central role. MID tasks were designed to mimic the animal model of the 
dopaminergic reward-anticipation response in the midbrain (where the cell bodies are 
located) and (particularly) the ventral striatum (where dopamine is released). Specifically, 
dopamine neurons increase their phasic activity in response to a cue that reliably predicts a 
primary reward, and in turn, more dopamine is released in the target regions (Schultz, 2001; 
Wise, 2004). As this response is highly similar to the one triggered by primary reward itself, it 
is assumed to reflect the appetitive value of the reward. However, dopamine responses to a 
cue not only reflect reward value, but are often intermixed with the behavioral activation or 
mental effort required to obtain the reward (Berridge, 2007; Robbins and Everitt, 2007; 
Salamone, 2009). Crucially, neural responses in the dopaminergic midbrain can also be 
elicited in the absence of reward when participants prepare for a high demand versus a low 
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demand task (Boehler et al., 2011; see also Krebs et al., 2012), which suggests that the 
dopaminergic system can be recruited in a top-down fashion. And indeed, there is evidence 
from functional-connectivity data that lateral prefrontal cortex is the prime input region that 
explains activity in the dopaminergic midbrain during cue processing in the MID task (Ballard 
et al., 2011). Together, it seems most likely that cue-locked dopamine responses reflect a 
mixture of value signals (‘I like that’) and activation signals (‘I will work for it’).  
In the case of our SRA tasks, the reward feature of the target stimulus is probably to 
some extent processed like a reward-predicting cue considering that it also acts as a symbol 
for delayed reward delivery (i.e., bonus money). Indeed, both MID and SRA tasks elicit 
similar neural responses in the ventral striatum, one of the prime target regions of 
dopaminergic neurons (e.g., MID: Engelmann et al., 2009; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011; 
Krebs et al., 2012; SRA: Krebs et al., 2011; Boehler et al., 2014). In keeping with the animal 
model, these responses could reflect an initial value assessment of the presented cue or 
target stimulus, which corresponds to the fast phasic response of dopaminergic neurons at 
about 50 to 100 ms after cue onset (Schultz, 2001). The crucial question that remains to be 
answered is whether there is enough time for the dopaminergic system to unfold activating, 
top-down influences in SRA paradigms - in addition to representing the reward value of a 
given stimulus, with some of the assumed functions presumably requiring some time to 
unfold (Braver et al., 2007). Intriguingly, the ventral striatum might nevertheless play a role in 
shaping performance in the SRA version of the Stroop task, in that its activity level was 
correlated with the behavioral benefit (Krebs et al., 2011). In contrast, in the SRA version of 
the Stop-signal task, we found that the striatum in all likelihood exclusively signaled 
performance outcome rather than contributing to shaping it, because it did not display any 
sensitivity to reward during unsuccessful Stop-trials, which also start off with the prospect of 
reward but ultimately don’t garner it. In the same task, we furthermore found that reward 
information seemed to impinge on the task-relevant areas via a pregenual anterior cingulate 
cortex area; a function that in MID-like tasks usually gets assigned to the ventral striatum 
(Schmidt et al., 2012). This may suggest that reward information can use qualitatively 
18 
 
different routes to impact behavior, depending on how much time there is for such influences 
to unfold. As a more general point related to such timing, it might be worth investigating 
whether the exact mechanism may sometimes not only depend on the sequence of events 
but also on the speed of progression, wherein a task that by definition involves reactive 
control might still use mechanisms that fall into a more proactive realm provided that there is 
sufficient time to implement them. Such general flexibility would again in principal fit the DMC 
model of Braver and colleagues (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012), which states that the 
exact nature of control processes will strongly depend on a number of factors pertaining to 
the task at hand, as well as on differences within and between groups of participants. 
 
Conclusions and outlook 
In the preceding chapter we have described a line of research that is only just unfolding. 
Specifically, we have reported a number of studies investigating the influence of reward on 
cognitive-control tasks that breaks with the typical reward-cuing procedure (MID) by 
associating reward directly to task-relevant stimuli (SRA). While it is evident that reward can 
nevertheless still have profound effects on behavioral performance, the underlying 
mechanisms have yet to be fully characterized. In particular, there is evidence that reward 
associations lead to enhanced activity in task-related control areas, which speaks in favor of 
the notion that reward associations enhance actual reactive control within a given trial. Yet, 
there is also evidence for some contribution by more automatic bottom-up processes mostly 
in the sense of increased saliency/prioritization of reward-related features, which however 
does not seem to alleviate the need for enhanced activity in control regions during task 
execution. While these processes mostly seem to act in concert to benefit performance, the 
bottom-up facilitation of a salient feature that is not compatible with the task goal can disrupt 
reactive control and ultimately impede performance. This latter observation is clearly in 
contrast to the solely beneficial effects of preparatory mechanisms triggered by reward cues. 
An important future extension would be a systematic investigation of the role of dimensional 
overlap between task-related and reward-related features. In the studies discussed in this 
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chapter, this overlap was maximal in the Stroop task, where a subset of target colors was 
made reward-relevant, so that reward trials were associated to a different behavioral 
response than no-reward trials. In the Stop-signal task, this overlap was less in that both 
Stop-stimulus colors required the same response (i.e., response inhibition). Yet, it was still 
the task-relevant stimulus that also communicated reward availability. Future studies might 
try to further limit this overlap, which would further emphasize the reactive nature of possible 
reward-related behavioral benefits. Moreover, while the combined results of different MID 
and SRA tasks suggest that the balance is tipped more towards proactive preparatory control 
in the former and more towards reactive control in the latter case, a direct comparison 
between the two paradigms with closely matched stimuli and task requirements will be critical 
to further illuminate the relationship and potential interaction between these two control 
realms.  
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